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The question of why humans 
possess superior cognitive skills 
has a long history in science. 
One important idea is that human 
intelligence has evolved in the 
social realm [1]. The rationale is 
that individuals who cooperate 
and compete well in a social 
setting do better and produce 
more offspring than less skilled 
individuals, and that these skills 
are heritable. The conditions for 
the evolution of social abilities may 
have been especially favourable 
in primates. Most primates live in 
individualised societies that are 
characterised by kin-based social 
networks, a situation that may 
have triggered an evolutionary 
arms race in social skills.
Social cognition concerns an 
individual’s ability to interact 
socially in an intelligent way. As 
it is near impossible to define 
intelligence objectively, a common 
research strategy has been to 
select a well-described human 
skill and investigate the degree 
to which it is present in animal 
subjects. 
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Monkeys were trained to select 
photographs of familiar group 
members, either mother–offspring 
dyads or other pairings. The 
study animals then successfully 
mastered novel combinations, 
demonstrating that they possess 
a social concept analogous to the 
human mother–child affiliation. 
We now know that primates can 
build up social knowledge from 
observations alone. After watching 
video clips of agonistic interactions 
between two unfamiliar 
conspecifics, rhesus monkeys 
were able to select the dominant 
individual in each interaction, and 
individuals were able to transfer 
their skill to novel video clips [5].
Under field conditions, such 
complicated techniques cannot 
be applied, and experimental 
work typically relies on much 
simpler paradigms. A successful 
approach has been to monitor 
vocal behaviour during social 
interactions, and to use the 
observed patterns as a basis 
for field playback experiments. 
Subordinate female baboons, 
for example, tend to produce 
fear-barks to a more dominant 
individual approaching them. 
Dominant females respond with 
grunts, especially if they desire to 
interact peacefully. These types 
of exchanges have successfully 
been used to mimic different types 
of social interactions for nearby 
listeners. In one particularly elegant 
experiment [6], baboons not only 
recognised the rank orders of 
the different group members, but 
they also understood to which 
matrilineal kin group the individuals 
belonged, demonstrating that 
primates organise social concepts 
in a hierarchical way. These 
and other studies indicate that 
Sapir’s [7] famous proposition 
that a “concept does not attain to 
individual and independent life until 
it has found a distinctive linguistic 
embodiment” is just not supported 
by the empirical evidence.
The biological function of social 
cognition
Dealing with conspecifics and 
other competitors
Another way of recognising social 
intelligence is by investigating 
an individual’s ability to create Figure 1. Living in large individualised groups with complex kin-based social networks 
favours individuals who are skilled at solving social problems. (Photo © Klaus Zuber-
bühler.)insightful and novel solutions 
that are not just the result of a 
blind trial-and-error approach 
[8]. Fast learning, powerful 
memory capacities, and the 
ability to shift representations 
on a mental ‘game board’ are 
all prerequisites for innovation. 
The animal literature is full of 
examples of seemingly insightful 
behaviour, although often in 
response to physical problems. In 
the social domain, progress has 
been made with observations of 
tactical deception in primates, 
cases where conspecifics are 
manipulated into acting on 
false information [9]. Tactics are 
probably mostly learned from 
experience, and not necessarily 
understood as deliberate 
changes of mental state. The 
extent of innovation is usually 
limited to using a familiar action 
in a novel context. The use 
of deception is by no means 
randomly spread across species, 
however: it covaries with the size of the neocortex, and neocortex 
volume has also been found 
to correlate with group size in 
primates [10]. 
These facts support the 
‘Machiavellian intelligence’ or 
‘social brain’ hypothesis, which 
proposes that large brains are 
an adaptation to the social 
complexity produced by living in 
long-term social groups. Social 
tactics that seem sophisticated, 
such as deception and 
cooperation, may be built on quite 
simple cognitive mechanisms: 
the main thing that is needed is 
efficient memory, to differentiate 
individuals and keep track of the 
webs of kinship, dominance and 
mutual favour-trading that make 
up simian social life (Figure 1). 
Presumably, similar levels of social 
complexity could be created in 
inter-specific associations, such 
as coral reef fish communities, 
and these could be used to 
test the association with brain 
enlargement [11].
3Dealing with predation by social 
means
Predation is one of the most 
powerful forces of natural 
selection, but it is not normally 
linked with cognitive evolution. A 
common adaptation to predation 
is the formation of social groups, 
in which individuals benefit from 
dilution effects and other simple 
‘safety-in-numbers’ benefits [12]. 
However, non-human primates 
may not benefit much from 
these advantages, because 
group members are often highly 
related to each other: losing a 
group member typically means 
losing a close relative. As a 
consequence, losing a genetic 
relative is a highly traumatic event 
for a primate [13]. The kin-based 
group structure, moreover, spoils 
some of the benefits of simple 
safety-in-number advantages 
that other groups of animals 
can profit from. It is interesting 
in this context that most forest 
primates have a strong tendency 
to form poly-specific associations, 
sometimes containing over half a 
dozen different monkey species, 
presumably to exploit mutual 
safety-in-number effects by 
associating with individuals to 
whom they are not related.
At the same time, primate 
kin-based groups appear to 
have served as a platform for 
the evolution of cooperative 
behaviours that require more 
advanced cognitive abilities. One 
particularly striking act of altruism 
is alarm calling. In Diana monkeys 
(Figure 2), alarm calls serve to 
name predator classes and thus 
inform nearby hearers about the 
nature of the danger, irrespective 
of urgency or other threat-related 
variables [14]. Diana monkeys 
have also been observed to 
eavesdrop on the vocal behaviour 
of other species, in some cases 
even the predators themselves. 
Campbell’s and putty- nosed 
monkeys are able to alter the 
meaning of their alarm calls by 
constructing more complex call 
combinations, and most forest 
monkeys use alarm calls to 
communicate directly to predators 
to disable stealth hunters [14,15]. 
In these contexts, individuals 
often behave as if they use 
simple deductive processes to Figure 2. Diana monkeys 
exhibit sophisticated cogni-
tive abilities when interact-
ing with conspecifics and 
other species. (Photo © 
Klaus Zuberbühler.)make optimal use of the available 
acoustic information. For instance, 
when hearing the alarm calls of 
crested guinea fowl, a gregarious 
terrestrial forest bird, Diana 
monkeys typically respond as if 
they had seen the birds’ major 
predator, a leopard. When the 
context was experimentally 
altered, such that it appeared that 
the birds’ alarm calls were given 
in response to a human poacher 
rather than a leopard, the monkeys 
remained silent, the most adaptive 
response to human poachers. 
These and other studies suggest 
that primates respond to the most 
likely cause of calls, rather than 
the calls themselves [14].
In sum, during predation 
events, primates regularly exhibit 
behavioural patterns that are 
typically regarded as indicators 
of advanced social intelligence, 
being based on understanding the 
predator and prey hierarchy, other 
species’ communication systems 
and the underlying reasons for 
signal production. Predation may 
have created complex problems 
similar to those encountered in 
social situations — or perhaps 
even greater. Not only is 
cooperation and competition with 
conspecifics involved in both 
cases, but to avoid predation 
individuals also need to interact 
with and predict the behaviour 
of other prey animals and the 
predators themselves. Selection 
pressures are high because 
behavioural errors can lead to 
the loss of life, while this is rarely 
the case during other social interactions. Primates have no 
weapons or safe microhabitats 
to protect themselves against 
predators, and their cognitive 
abilities appear to be their most 
powerful tools [16].
Enlarging the diet set by social 
means
The problems created by 
within- group complexity and 
predator avoidance apply to both 
monkeys and apes, in proportion 
to (respectively) their group 
size and predation vulnerability. 
However, many researchers 
have noted that one taxon, the 
great apes, appears cognitively 
advanced compared to monkeys, 
even though the apes live in 
no larger groups and their size 
renders them less vulnerable to 
predation than most monkeys [17]. 
This puzzle has led theorists to 
examine possible environmental 
challenges that might have 
selected for more advanced 
cognition, highlighting the fact that 
all great apes — and few if any 
monkeys — deal with mechanically 
tricky feeding or locomotor tasks 
in their daily life [18]. 
Even here, social cognition may 
come into play. Where complex 
skills are needed to obtain and 
process hidden or physically 
defended food items, social 
companions present a potential 
source of valuable knowledge: 
the extent to which an individual 
can tap this knowledge depends 
on its abilities in social learning. 
Simple forms of social learning 
are available to many species, 
4but to learn elaborate skills by 
observation requires the ability 
to ‘parse’ another behaviour, 
thereby understanding how to 
replicate the effective actions [19]. 
From understanding another’s 
behaviour it is a small step to 
understanding their plans and 
reasons for carrying them out, and 
a case can be made that human 
capacities to understand mental 
states derive ultimately from 
selection pressures on non-human 
apes to learn complex feeding 
skills (Figure 3).
The limits of animal social 
cognition
Despite these examples of 
apparently intelligent behaviour, 
non-human primates and other 
animals are also remarkably 
limited in some of their cognitive 
capacities. A cardinal aspect of 
human cognition is the ability to 
take the mental perspective of 
another individual, sometimes 
called ‘theory of mind’ or 
‘mentalizing’ ability. In its fullest 
sense, this ability is restricted to 
humans, but some animals show 
certain component abilities. For 
example, scrub jays are able 
to predict the movements of a 
competitor, based on assessing 
its visual perspective and recent 
history of interaction, an ability 
also found in chimpanzees [20,21]. 
Related to this, when interacting 
with a human experimenter who 
is looking behind a barrier, some 
corvids and great apes position 
themselves such that they can 
see what the experimenter is 
looking at, suggesting that they 
attempt to take the experimenter’s 
visual perspective [22,23]. Yet, 
chimpanzees, and perhaps 
non- human animals in general, 
have difficulties sharing attention 
and intention with others. 
A variety of evidence suggests 
that these psychological 
processes are pivotal for language 
acquisition and other culturally 
transmitted behaviours in 
humans. Although primates have 
intentions and can recognise 
those of other individuals, they 
apparently lack the ability or 
motivation to share them [24]. 
A good diagnostic for shared 
intentionality is an individual’s 
attempting to re-engage a Figure 3. A new-born moun-
tain gorilla has ample op-
portunities to watch skil-
ful and complex foraging 
activity before it meets the 
challenge of extracting food 
from hidden or defended 
sources. (Photo © Richard 
Byrne.)partner who suddenly stops a 
cooperative interaction. Children 
reliably start to communicate to 
reluctant partners, something that 
is not observed in chimpanzees. 
Hence, although non-human 
primates can engage in simple 
cooperative acts, and appear 
to have some understanding 
of others’ intentions, they 
seem unable to converge on 
and uphold a state of shared 
intentionality [25].
Conclusions
Most theoretical advances 
concerning the evolution of social 
cognition have emerged from 
research with human children and 
non-human primates. The two 
groups are remarkably similar in 
many aspects of social cognition, 
but some striking differences 
have been observed. Only human 
children are able to go beyond 
perspective taking and engage 
in true mentalizing. Related to 
this, only children are able to 
jointly attend with a partner to 
an external object and to engage 
in coordinated, cooperative 
interactions that are based on 
understanding and sharing of 
intentions, perhaps the cognitive basis for ratcheted cultural 
developments of humans. 
Although the social domain 
appears to be a particularly rich 
breeding ground for the evolution 
of intelligence, it is noteworthy 
that a large number of primate 
species, including most apes, live 
in comparatively small groups with 
relatively simple social networks. 
Baboon-like large and socially 
complex groups, composed of 
many reproductively active males 
and females, which generate 
a continuous stream of social 
challenges, are not necessarily 
typical for primates. It is also not 
clear whether it is right to assume 
that social complexity increases 
with group size, especially if 
individuals are interested in the 
social relations of only a select 
number of particular group 
members.
We have mentioned two 
additional potentially important 
contexts, in which advanced social 
abilities are likely to evolve due 
to the significant fitness benefits 
provided for the individual: the 
ability to avoid predators and the 
ability to enlarge diet by social 
means. In both contexts, success 
is based on behaviour reading 
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5and appreciation of the underlying 
mental processes. It is also the 
case that some of the most 
relevant problems encountered 
by primates possess both a social 
and an ecological dimension, 
which are often intrinsically 
entangled. For example, avoiding 
predation depends on an 
individual’s ability to predict a 
predator’s behaviour as well as 
on its social skills in gaining the 
anti- predator benefits generated 
by group-life, and learning 
complex skills depends on tapping 
the accumulated skill base of 
other group members. Empirically 
sorting out the relative contribution 
of these different evolutionary 
forces is no trivial undertaking.
Finally, the vast majority of 
empirical research on social 
cognition has been conducted 
with primates, probably because 
researchers interested in these 
questions prefer to work with 
phylogenetically close relatives. 
However, there is no reason 
to assume that the same 
principles and evolutionary 
pressures have not acted on 
other groups of animals, and 
that some non-primate species 
possess comparable social 
intelligence. The current literature 
is consistent with the idea that 
natural selection does not need 
a primate brain to endow it with 
social intelligence. An important 
challenge for the future, thus, will 
be to determine in what ways 
other groups of animals, such as 
corvids or social carnivores, are 
similar to or differ from primates 
in their social intelligence or 
in the underlying motivation to 
display it.References
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